'Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics'- How are Synthetic Apriori Judgments Possible?

I'm reading the corpus of Martin Heidegger's work right now to see if there are philosophical issues and stances that need to be addressed. As so many University philosophy departments throughout the U.S. and Europe since WWII have been influenced by his work, it is necessary to do a careful review of the work and the secondary scholarship surrounding it.

Of course the two main texts that lay out his early Philosophical positions are 'Being and Time' and 'Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics', which is a technical exposition of Heidegger's interpretation of 'The Critique of Pure Reason'.

Although I am still in the middle of reading the latter of these two works, there is one Philosophical issue that can be addressed. The nature of this address has nothing to do, right now, with Heidegger's interpretation, but addresses the central question of the 'Critique of Pure Reason'. This question determines the layout of the entire Kantian project of such a critique, and as such is one of the most famous questions in the history of Philosophy.

This question is 'How are synthetic apriori judgments possible?'

As Kant answers this question in the form of a Critique of Pure Reason, and as the technical issues of this question are complex, but also reductive to a few central focal points- as Heidegger demonstrates, this is not the time nor the forum to address at length these issues.

What I will say in way of a very general statement about Heidegger's treatment, is that he reduces what Kant calls the two pure intuitions of Time and Space into that of only Time, and then from this focuses on what Kant calls the "Power of the Imagination as a faculty of the Mind or Soul" as the main mental instrument of the core synthesis of what Heidegger calls "Pure Intuition and Pure Thinking". This, in a very general answer, is the overall approach Heidegger takes in his technical exposition of the Kantian elaboration of the answer of "How are synthetic apriori judgments possible?" that forms 'The Critique of Pure Reason'. The 'Critique of Pure Reason' is then Kant's demonstration, through an exposition of pure reason alone, of how synthetic apriori judgments are possible.

What I will say about the answer to this central question, of "how are synthetic apriori judgments possible?", is that way too much has been made about the formalistic charge against Kant by critics after the the turn of the 20th century. But then what would Philosophers and Kant's political opponents do if it were admitted that he really had it right?

There is a simple answer to this question that completely supports both Kant's approach and exposition- and this answer is one that is empiricist, pragmatic, and embodiedly realistic in nature. It does however every so slightly modify, or vary from, the original Kantian exposition, but it is an answer that will make it much simpler for students of Philosophy to understand. It was an answer I gave at a graduate seminar audited on the Critique of Pure Reason in SIU Carbondale somewhere between '83 and '85.

How are synthetic apriori judgments possible? Kant answers the question from the position of utilizing only Pure Reason- from the what we know of thinking and experience from only thinking. From another angle it can be answered in only two words.....The Brain.

A Note on Heideggerian "Primordial Thinking"

In Being and Time Heidegger states the goal of reaching a more "primordial thinking". The way that this thinking is described in 'Being and Time', 'Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics', and the essay 'What is Called Thinking', renders this project nothing less than MYTHICAL. As Heidegger attempts to describe it, there is no such thing.

The goal of this project of Heidegger's is merely a contrarian reaction to the beginning of Kant's 'Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals', which advocates a precise and careful approach to the study of the roots of Practical reason and morals, so that public discourse and thinking on these matters does not fall into "a barbaric state".

If there is such a thing as "primordial thinking", it is precisely using knowledge and expertise to advantage in practical situations- the use of practical reason- and the ever advancing increase in this knowledge and expertise.

This is indicated in 'the Kant Variations' in a couple of places, but for this note it is found specifically in the analysis of the root of math and numbers- of the number one which is derived from the ONE thing as the object of desire. Reason "zeroes in" on the object that is useful for need, and so desire is brought to the precision of action that meets specific need through the process of thinking. So then also FINDING the precision that is necessary for useful knowledge and action to be useful through study and research is equally part of this natural thinking. This is then TRUE "primordial thinking".

But this is nothing less than normal practical thinking, the analysis of which is found in the 'Critique of Practical Reason'.

Addendum 2: "Being There"- The Claim of the Problem of Translation

In 'Being and Time', Heidegger's formulation of Dasein(Being There)as a fundamental condition of human experience, led to a claim of a diminished transfer of the essence of experience in communication, and in later Heidegger scholarship to what was referred as the "problem of translation". This leads to the false conclusion that experience between humans is not really common, and that the experiences of others cannot really be understood.

It is a bizarre book that attempts to communicate that communication doesn't communicate, as the expression of writing is just as much experience as other experiences. Why even write a book if your belief is that experience and understanding cannot be communicated? The true believer in such a false theory doesn't even write the book, why would one waste their time?

In the pathological sense- the bodily sense- we know this to be false, as each of us with normal neurological activity must take our hand from the stove burner lest it be permanently damaged, as each of us do not see bone structure through only movement- as the t-rex did, as noone on earth possesses xray vision.

Paul Ricoeur rightly located this perspective in an overly self-absorbed and concentrated analysis of inner personal feeling, in the mistake that because experience is lived as "mine", that it is essentially unlike others. If this were true there would never be ANY human family connection, of love established between mother and children, or between sisters and brothers. Empathy works to help establish these connections- these connections that last, and these connections that we mourn if lost. But we do feel the pain when our mother cries, and we do feel the pain and are worried when our brothers are sick, and we feel the pain through the stories of these experiences of our loved ones.

Heidegger's formulation of Dasein as fundamental is incorrect, it describes the view of the conscious choice to stop connecting with others, and the view of self inner "feeling" as a priority over action. It was for this reason that Ricoeur did not subscribe to Heidegger's position. Ricoeur felt it led to an unnecessary self pity- I agree with his view.